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Sketches of a Redemptive Theory of
Contract Law
Emily M.S. Houh*
This Article is about the game we call contract law and what it does and means to those
who, at one time or another, have been categorically barred from play. How have
“outsider” players—such as racial minorities, women, and sexual minorities—entered the
game and, subsequently, how have its governing rules—that is, contract doctrines—
applied or not applied to them? On the flipside, how have common law contract
doctrines responded to the entry of new players in the game? And, to the extent contract
law has so responded, why has it done so? In asking and responding to these questions,
this Article begins to examine how contract law facilitates, internalizes, and resists
changing social contexts and movements. More broadly, as other scholars have done, it
offers an alternative to the “formalist-realist” narrative of contract law by demonstrating
how contract law has functioned and continues to function as an “engine of social
change” that simultaneously “transforms” and “preserves” a stratified socioeconomic
order based on race, gender, and sex. This Article further argues that by so functioning,
the regime of American contract law legitimates or “redeems” itself within the neoliberal
project of the American legal system as it responds to periods of transformative social,
cultural, political, and economic upheaval.

* Gustavus Henry Wald Professor of the Law and Contracts and Co-Director of the Center for
Race, Gender, and Social Justice, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Many thanks to Louis
Bilionis, Danielle Kie Hart, Kristin Kalsem, and Verna Williams for their comments and support, and
to Errin Jordan for her assistance in unearthing the cases discussed in this Article. This Article is
dedicated to Professor Charles L. Knapp, whose fifty years of teaching and writing on contract law
continues to inspire us all.
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Introduction
When is a deal, good or bad, something more than just a deal? What
does the deal, by its own terms or the rules governing its formation and
performance, tell us about social conditions, about who has access to
economic power vis-à-vis a contract and who does not, and about how
terms and rules might apply differently to those with power and those
without? In responding to these questions, this Article examines, through
a close reading of two little-known cases from the early twentieth
century, how contract law facilitates, internalizes, and resists changing
social mores and movements.
This process of doctrinal response and internalization describes a
“redemptive” tendency in contract law, where such “redemption” refers
to a discursive legal process and project that maintains social status
1
regimes. In contract law, this tendency usually manifests itself in a more
robust application of equitable contract doctrines. During periods of such
redemption, contract law transforms into a “kinder and gentler” version
of itself, one that makes its benefits and protections available to those
who formerly had been exploited by it, but only to a degree. Thus, as
these social “outsiders” enter and engage in the game of contracts, they
may simultaneously be empowered and marginalized by the very rules
that gave them entrance in the first place. This redemptive theory of
contract law explains how the system remains, in reality, “rigged,” even
as the rules change to accommodate new players.
More broadly, this Article also begins to create an alternate
narrative to the well-established formalist-realist account of contract law
by demonstrating how contract law has functioned as an “engine of social
change” that simultaneously “transforms” and “preserves” a stratified

1. The concept is borrowed from Sumi Cho, who originated a theory of racial redemption in
Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial
Redemption, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 73, 75 (1998) (defining “racial redemption” as a “psycho-social and
ideological process through which whiteness maintains its fullest reputational value”).
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socioeconomic order based on race, gender, sex, and, of course, class. In
doing so, American contract law contributes to the legitimization of the
neoclassical (and, of late, increasingly neoliberal) American legal system
in times of social, cultural, political, and economic upheaval.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the AngloAmerican development of equitable contract doctrines and historically
contextualizes those developments as part of the liberal response to late
nineteenth-century Lochnerian contract orthodoxy. It also explores
questions related to how contract orthodoxy of the period, as an
institutional and systemic matter, supported the socioeconomic relations
in which the orthodoxy itself was embedded. Part II presents two case
studies of contract law “redeeming” itself in response to or as part of
broader socioeconomic and sociocultural changes during the postReconstruction, Jim Crow era. Critical analyses of these cases
demonstrate how contract law, perhaps in trying to keep up with the
times, simultaneously preserves existing socioeconomic status regimes,
thus serving as another example of “preservation through transformation.”
3

I. A Brief Meta-Narrative of Equity
Contract law—or, as Morton Horwitz has termed it, “the legal
paradigm of voluntary market relations”—undergirds our market
4
economy. If one accepts the argument of twentieth-century institutional
economists and their progeny that the market is a “social construct” as
5
opposed to an “invisible hand,” contract law can function legitimately to
distribute rights and obligations among and between private parties only
if it does so justly. Equitable contract doctrines, in part, perform this
legitimating work vis-à-vis their explicit attempts to provide those most

2. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J.
2117, 2180 (1996) (describing her theory of “preservation-through-transformation” as a “modif[ication
of] the rules and reasons by which the legal system distributes social goods so as to produce a new
regime, formally distinguishable from its predecessor, that will protect the privileges of heretofore
dominant groups, although not necessarily to the same degree”).
3. This meta-narrative speaks to the oft characterized “swinging of the pendulum” between
formalism and realism in contract law. See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 32–
63 (1995). Also, before delving into what necessarily will be a very general history of the modern
development of equitable doctrines in American contract law, I am obligated to set out all the usual
caveats. Of course, what follows in the text is the most cursory of historical overviews of the
development of equitable contract law. Moreover, this overview focuses exclusively on English and
American contract law. It draws mostly from comprehensive works on the histories of the equitable
and common law of contract, namely on the works of those such as Morton Horwitz, Larry DiMatteo,
Alfred W.B. Simpson, and P.S. Atiyah.
4. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960, at 194 (1992).
5. Id. at 195; see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment
and the Myth of Natural Order (2011) (tracing historical development of the Western “free
market” and the rise of the punitive carceral state as philosophically and politically linked, and arguing
that both are anything but part of a “natural order”).
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in need with protections against economic exploitation by the more
sophisticated and dominant among us.
Modern equitable contract law has its origins in early Roman and
canon law of the twelfth century, which itself was centrally informed by
6
the moral concepts of equality in exchange, just price, and just contract.
For at least two centuries, the notion of “just exchange,” the value of which
was based on the cost of producing a particular good or service, dominated
7
the English law of contract, or exchange. During this time, the English
Court of Chancery developed and applied a theory of equitable contract
whose principles, for example, barred enforcement of “unconscionable”
8
contracts. In its efforts to extend the law’s protection to the “poor and
9
helpless” against the “powerful and lawless,” the Chancery Court
continued to do equity even in the fourteenth century, when the English
common law courts had begun their “retreat . . . into the formalistic, non10
discretionary domain of the writ system.” There, the action of
assumpsit—the precursor to the modern breach of contract action—took
11
root. In fact, by the end of the sixteenth century, actions of assumpsit
made up the majority of contract cases in the English courts. By this
time, the executory contract likewise had come to be viewed largely as
12
the mutual exchange of promises, rather than as a set of just exchanges.
By the eighteenth century, the merger of courts of equity and courts
13
of law in the Anglo and American legal systems was well underway.
Consequently, courts during this period attempted to develop a totalizing
theory of contract that would unify equitable contract principles with
14
more formalistic principles of assumpsit. By this time as well, certain
residual doctrines based on earlier theories of just price had become
15
firmly established in the English law of contract. Further, the equity
courts had by then developed, in particular cases, a jurisprudence around

6. Larry A. DiMatteo, Equitable Law of Contracts: Standards and Principles 4–28 (2001).
7. Id. at 29–41.
8. Id. at 28. DiMatteo enumerates three important principles of equity developed under the just
price theory. First, contract rules should favor debtors over creditors (assuming inequitable conduct on
the part of the latter). Second, in particular cases, contracts may be subject to reformation in order to
achieve justice. Finally, unconscionable contracts should not be enforced. Id.
9. Id. at 27.
10. Id.
11. See Alfred W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract 199–315 (1987)
(tracing history of contract actions from the action of assumpsit to the action for assumpsit for breach
of promise, and connecting them to older remedies preceding such development).
12. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
917, 918–19 (1974).
13. DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 29–32.
14. Id. at 35. For example, Lord Mansfield attempted to develop a unifying theory of contract
based on morality of promise.
15. For example, by the eighteenth century, common law courts had come to recognize the
principle of “customary price.” Id. at 33.
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principles of justice, conscience, and fairness, often through doctrines
16
such as fraud and mistake. All of these doctrines found their way into a
unified theory of contract law, although assumpsit dominated contract
17
jurisprudence during this time.
Turning specifically to the history of equitable contract law in the
18
United States, legal historian Morton Horwitz argues that American
contract law of the eighteenth century bore significant ties to property law.
This was so because contractual disputes were being settled under titlebased theories of exchange, since markets in goods had not yet developed
19
to a point at which goods might be considered fungible. Countering the
conventional narrative about the development of Anglo contract law,
Horwitz further asserts that exchange during the eighteenth century was
still largely thought of not in terms of monetary return, but of fairness of
20
the exchange. Elaborating on these ties to the law of property and the
law of contractual equity, which fundamentally impacted the development
of the doctrine of consideration, Horwitz concludes that eighteenth
century contract law in the United States “was essentially antagonistic to
21
the interests of the commercial classes.”

16. Id. at 33–34.
17. See Simpson, supra note 11.
18. Horwitz’s project—in vastly oversimplified terms, to deconstruct the myth of law’s neutrality
and expose its inherently political and ideological nature—spawned two now classic monographs, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (1977), and Horwitz, supra note 4. While generally well
received by nonlegal historians, Horwitz’s account of legal history stirred not only discomfort but also
hostility among legal scholars and historians, who asserts generally (but passionately) that Horwitz does
not provide adequate evidence to support his claims. Those critiques, as well as Horwitz’s own works, can
themselves be read with varying degrees of skepticism, but the importance of Transformation I (and
Transformation II, for that matter) as great works of intellectual history cannot be refuted. See Laura
Kalman, Transformations, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 849, 855 (2001) (“Transformation came out at a time when all of
its readers had recently seen the power of law to do evil. It also appeared at a time when its liberal audience
was losing hope that the Burger Court would follow in the Warren Court’s footsteps. . . . If it were right,
perhaps readers who had gone to law school to learn to do good, even to become legal historians, had
chosen the wrong careers. The reaction to Transformation was so intense among lawyers and legal
historians, I believe, because it reinforced our darkest suspicions and fears.”); Wythe Holt, Morton
Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 663, 722 (1982)
(“Despite its shortcomings, which can be remedied by Marxist historiography, Transformation stands as
a monumental achievement. Bourgeois historians and bourgeois historiography have been
demonstrated to be what they are, biased and partial rather than neutral and timeless. The ‘consensus’
assumptions underpinning all schools of mainstream American legal history have been shown to be
partisan, and partisan from the standpoint of the elite. The way has been cleared for legal historians to
place the focus where it belongs, on socioeconomic evidence of class conflict . . . .”).
19. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 920.
20. Id. at 920–24.
21. Id. at 927. Horwitz further explains that while eighteenth century contract law might have been
“antagonistic” toward the commercial classes, businesspersons certainly were not without recourse. They
employed informal and alternative modes of dispute settlement. They also developed other “legal forms of
agreement” that enabled them to settle potential disputes without resorting to the courts, such as the “penal
bond” (which more contemporary students of contract law probably know as the “sealed instrument”),
which “precluded all inquiry into the adequacy of consideration for an exchange.” Id. at 927–28.
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According to Horwitz, contract law in the United States began to
break from its equitable roots in the late eighteenth century as a result of
the rise of the American market economy. Because of industrialization
and the development of extensive and myriad markets in fungible goods,
executory contracts increasingly came to signify not a fairness of exchange
between parties, represented by the customary setting of prices independent
of agreed upon terms; rather, they came to signify the parties’ expectation
22
of return. This fundamental change in how exchange was being
understood in American jurisprudence led to the development and
subsequent normalization of awarding expectation damages as the
23
paradigmatic remedy for breach of contract.
This, in turn, paved the way for the “radical” turn in American
contract law away from equitable concepts toward a “will theory” concept
of exchange, or what we now refer to as “classical” contract law. By the
early nineteenth century, clear expressions and applications of a marketoriented will theory of contract reflected the idea that money, rather
than custom, justice, or policy, should be the sole standard of making
contracts and resolving contractual disputes (because the market value of
24
goods constantly fluctuated, there could be no objectively “fair” price).
Observers at this time saw the writing on the wall. Those who
opposed the turn to a market-driven theory of contract worried about
confining fairness concerns to narrowly and infrequently applied doctrines
such as fraud and, more generally, about the effects of such systemic and
institutional change, which they feared would consolidate growing social
25
and economic inequalities. Their fears were not unfounded. During the
classical era, for example, American contract law, once primarily concerned
with labor and preventing economic exploitation, had come to favor the
26
interests of industry and commercialism. American contract law, once
embedded with public law norms of equity, was going private; fairness of
27
exchange was giving way to freedom of contract. This shift in contract
law’s priorities—from public to private, from principles of equity to
principles of free will—demonstrates how contract law functions both to
maintain and alter the socioeconomic order.

22. Id. at 937.
23. Id. Consistent with the development of American commodities markets, expectation damages
were first recognized by the courts in cases involving stock speculation. Prior to the late eighteenth
century, specific performance was deemed the appropriate remedy for “failure to deliver stock on a
rising market.” Id. But because of the developing futures market for the speculation of state securities
in the United States, American courts began awarding expectation damages on contracts of stock
speculation in states like South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Id. at 937–41.
24. Id. at 946–57.
25. Id. at 949.
26. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
27. See DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 44–45.
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Of course, this jurisprudential shift in contract law would not have
been possible without the support of the courts, which embraced and
readily applied the concept of expectation damages, while also limiting
the circumstances in which they would award restitutionary or quantum
28
meruit damages. Horwitz claims (somewhat controversially ) that these
juridical trends reflected changing class sympathies, as well: Where once
the courts had seen themselves as protectors of farmers, employees, and
small traders, they began to see themselves, at the turn of the century, as
29
an important part of the engine of American economic modernization.
Thus, their sympathies shifted toward employers and commercial and
30
industrial interests.
The will theory of contract reached its high point in 1905 when the
Supreme Court decided Lochner v. New York, which struck down the
state of New York’s maximum-hour laws in the baking industry as
31
unconstitutionally interfering with freedom of contract. According to
Horwitz, the Lochner decision “brought Progressive Legal Thought into
being . . . . [It] galvanized Progressive opinion and eventually led to a
32
fundamental assault on the legal thought of the old order.” The
Progressives, who laid the intellectual foundation for the Realists, effected
this assault by critiquing basic assumptions underlying the private law of
contract. For example, they argued that objectivism, long thought to be
33
fundamental to will theory, was actually incompatible with it. Though
objectivism had first been employed to achieve more predictable contracts,
which resulted in the establishment of more formalistic legal rules in
contract, the Progressives demonstrated how its application could result
in contractual outcomes that were completely divergent from the actual

28. See supra note 18.
29. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 953–55.
30. Id. Horwitz supports this claim by comparing the ways in which courts were then awarding
damages in different categories of cases. For example, he points out that in disputes involving service
contracts, courts tended to award expectation damages against laborers/employees who “voluntarily”
broke contracts and deny their quantum meruit claims for service rendered. Id. at 955. In building and
construction contracts, on the other hand, courts more often awarded quantum meruit damages for the
breaching builders’ reasonable value of performance. Id. at 954. Horwitz attributes this inconsistency
to the courts’ shifting biases toward the interests of development and commercialization. He writes
that penalizing builders in contractual disputes
could have deterred economic growth by limiting investment in high risk enterprise. Just as
the building trade was beginning to require major capital investment during the second
quarter of the nineteenth century, courts were prepared to bestow upon it that special
solicitude which American courts have reserved for infant industry.
Id. at 955. On penal provisions in service contracts, Horwitz explains that they had “only redistributional
consequences, since they [could] hardly be expected to deter laboring classes from selling their services in
a subsistence economy.” Id.
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 33.
33. Id. at 35–39.
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34

will of the parties. They also attacked, to varying degrees, the related
incorporation of agency principles into contract law, and the notion of
35
objective causation in contract law.
In exposing the objective theory of contract as ideological rather
than scientific in nature, the Progressives also aggressively critiqued
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s implementation, in the late nineteenth
century at Harvard Law School, of a new, more “scientific” legal
36
pedagogy—namely, the case method approach to the study of law.
Generations of legal scholars and students have since internalized the
“realist” critique of Langdell’s now fully entrenched method. Yet, we
must not lose sight of the fact that this turn toward a hard “formalist”
study of law, and particularly contract law, may have occurred not wholly
as a result of an attempt to ideologically hijack the law from the “other
side,” but as a result of Langdell’s attempt, which could be understood as
a sort of political and protectionist intervention in its own right, to ensure
a continued place for legal education within the American university
system, which by that time had begun to actively embrace and prioritize
scientific research and research methodologies, particularly in the social
37
sciences.
In any event, the Progressives’ multipronged assault on Lochnerian
thinking eventually morphed into what we now call the Legal Realist
movement of the early and mid-twentieth century. It is the Realists who
are most often credited with the important jurisprudential insight that
law is, fundamentally, political, and that orthodox formalism masks the
38
political, ideological and, indeed, hegemonic nature of legal institutions.
This insight, of course, was subsequently mined to an extreme by critical
legalists of the late twentieth century and, to a different degree, by later
39
critical race theorists. But as both Morris Cohen and Larry DiMatteo state,

34. Id. at 35–56.
35. Id. at 39–63.
36. See, e.g., James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) (advocating reliance on
administrative agencies and regulation, rather than on the judiciary and the common law, to address
the nuances and particularities of different fields of law and industry); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908) (criticizing the rule-bound formalism of turn-of-the-century
American judicial decisionmaking and jurisprudence).
37. See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 13–16 (1997) (discussing Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s development, in the late nineteenth century, of the “science” of the
study of law as part of a scientific revolution in American higher education).
38. American Legal Realism (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); Brian Leiter, Naturalizing
Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism in Legal Philosophy (2007); Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (2010); Gregory Scott
Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 683 (2008); Mae C. Quinn, Feminist
Legal Realism, 35 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1 (2012).
39. See, e.g., Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983).
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in different terms and different eras, law is dialectical in nature. The law
of contract, for example, should not be viewed in absolute terms, as only
formalistic or only equitable; in fact, contemporary commentators argue
41
that, as a matter of descriptive accuracy, it never has been. It should
provide both a degree of certainness and predictability, as well as a degree of
fairness and justice. There is room in contract law for objectivism,
subjectivism, economic efficiency, and community standards of fair and
just practices.
This view, not merely academic, is reflected in twentieth century
42
doctrinal developments and statutory interventions into contract law,
best exemplified by the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), itself one
of the most successful legacies of the Realist movement. On the one hand,
the U.C.C. has been characterized as a “highly specific codification of
contract law [that] removes discretion from the judicial branch and limits
43
their ability to fashion equitable solutions to contract disputes.” At the
same time, Patrick Atiyah aptly notes that statutes like the U.C.C. were
44
“designed to ensure substantive fairness in exchange.” Anyone who has
studied, even briefly, Article 2 of the U.C.C., understands that both
Guido Calabresi and Atiyah are correct in their assessments of the
dialectical nature of modern statutory interventions in contract law:
certainty and fairness live side by side—sometimes successfully and
sometimes not—in the U.C.C. The same can be said of the modern common
law of contract.
This Article builds upon this narrative of American contract law by
reframing the contractual dialectic not just as one of formalism and realism,
45
of certainty and fairness; but also as one of economic and cultural injustice,
of material and discursive effect. In this way, it works to uncover the
discursive connections between contract law and legal status regimes more
generally. The next Part examines two cases, in historical and
socioeconomic context, that perform this work.

40. Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy (Transaction
Books Inc. 1982) (1933); DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 65–68.
41. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 737
(2000); Danielle Kie Hart, Cross Purposes & Unintended Consequences: Karl Llewellyn, Article 2, and
the Limits of Social Transformation, 12 Nev. L.J. 54 (2011); Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can’t
Revoke, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 309; Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel,
49 Hastings L.J. 1191 (1998).
42. See supra notes 6–24 and accompanying text.
43. DiMatteo, supra note 6, at 101; see also Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes (1982).
44. P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. Toronto L.J. 1, 3 (1985).
45. See Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’
Age, 212 New Left Rev. 68, 69 (1995).
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II. Contractual Redemption: Making a Case
This Part discusses, in historical context, two cases in which
“outsider” contract parties—that is, persons who had been historically, if
not legally, restricted from participating to varying degrees in or within
the burgeoning market economy because of their marginalized positions
46
on the spectra of socially constructed status regimes —attempted to
access, with state sanction, economic power via the “legal paradigm of
voluntary market relations” and, more specifically, vis-à-vis equitable
contract doctrines. Both cases were brought by black plaintiffs unhappy
with their contractual arrangements and both were decided by southern
appellate courts during the rise of Jim Crow. In both cases, the black
plaintiffs won. Despite these ostensibly positive outcomes, more critical
examination reveals how contract law, at a doctrinal level, can be used in
service of both progressive and regressive social change, often
simultaneously.
Two caveats must be given before analyzing the cases. First, these
47
48
two cases, Caldwell v. Insurance Co. of Virginia and Bussell v. Bishop,
were chosen from the early Jim Crow era—a period marked by social,
economic, and political resistance to the abolition of slavery, passage of
the Reconstruction amendments, and enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (“Act”)—in order to closely examine how members of
subordinated groups could use existing common law doctrines during
such times. Section 1981 of the Act had only recently enabled the
plaintiffs in Caldwell and Bussell to enter into their respective contracts
49
in the first place. Notably, the plaintiffs in both cases turned to contract
law to enforce the economic and civil rights guaranteed them under the Act.
As such, the cases demonstrate how contract law played a part in filling the
interstices of a civil rights jurisprudence that was then only in its infancy.
Second, this Article focuses on the Caldwell and Bussell cases
because, while individual assertions of legal rights, regardless of whether
backed by larger movement strategists, may elicit critiques about false
50
consciousness and legal hegemony, there is something extraordinary and
inspiring about the plaintiffs’ attempts to assert and transform what the law
46.
47.
48.
49.

For example, blacks, women, and Asians, among others.
52 S.E. 252 (N.C. 1905).
110 S.E. 174 (Ga. 1921).
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 states:

[C]itizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory of the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, . . . and
to full and equal benefit of the laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.
Civil Rights Act, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2015)).
50. See, e.g., William E. Forbath et al., Introduction: Legal Histories From Below, 1985 Wis. L.
Rev. 759, 765.
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meant as a matter of civil and economic life. Their attempts demonstrate
51
that “law is an important and appropriate terrain of social conflict.”
Caldwell and Bussell both involve known black plaintiffs who proactively brought suit seeking equitable relief based in contract. It is
doubtful that these cases have any authoritative value; Caldwell, decided
in 1905, has not been cited by a court since 1925, and Bussell, decided in
1921, not since 1940. Additionally, these cases have never been discussed
in a scholarly publication. Given the era during which they were decided,
however, these decisions and their consequences as legal texts are
extraordinary. To fully understand why this is so, a brief and very
oversimplified overview of the Jim Crow era follows.
A. Brief Notes on Reconstruction and the Rise of Jim Crow
Legal historian and leading reparations scholar Alfred Brophy
describes the Jim Crow era as “the period between the end of
Reconstruction and the beginning of the modern civil rights movement,
when African Americans were subject to state-sponsored discrimination in
52
education, housing, employment, and public accommodations.” Following
the passage of the Reconstruction amendments, southern states in the 1970s
enacted Black Codes and Jim Crow laws to establish strict segregation
between whites and blacks in almost every facet of life. Many leading
historians of slavery, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow, however, including C.
Vann Woodward and Leon F. Litwack, point out that although Jim Crow
laws were enacted and enforced to an extreme in the post-Reconstruction
South, such laws had their origins in the pre-Civil War North, where “the
Northern Negro was made painfully aware that he lived in a society
53
dedicated to the doctrine of white supremacy and Negro inferiority.”
Sectional reconciliation and northern acquiescence to southern
redemption and “home rule” during the post-Reconstruction era further
54
contributed to a national retreat on the issue of racial equality. This was

51. Id.
52. Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C.
Third World L.J. 81, 86 (2004).
53. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow: A Commemorative Edition 18, 17–21
(Oxford University Press 2002) (1955); see Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the
Free States 1790–1860 (1961).
54. Constitutional scholar and legal historian Michael J. Klarman has written that several factors,
including “sectional reconciliation,” explain Northern capitulation to Jim Crow during the late nineteenth
century. Those factors include: increasing black migration to the North, which “heightened the racial
anxieties of northern whites”; the rise of northern racial nativism in response to the massive wave of
Southern and Eastern European immigration to the Northeast; American imperialism and its accompanying
ideology of Manifest Destiny in countries inhabited by brown-skinned peoples, such as Hawaii, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines; post-Reconstruction sectional reconciliation, in part facilitated by the SpanishAmerican War; and, last but not least, the Republican party’s turn against the protection of black civil
rights. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle
for Racial Equality 14–15 (2004).
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reflected in Supreme Court decisions of the time, which limited the reach
55
of the Reconstruction Amendments and culminated in the (in)famous
1896 Supreme Court decision sanctioning separate-but-equal railway
56
segregation, Plessy v. Ferguson. Thus, and to borrow Woodward’s famous
57
phrase, “the strange career of Jim Crow” was well underway.
As Woodward and others have pointed out, however, Jim Crow did
not immediately emerge as the way forward in the post-Reconstruction
South. There existed alternative approaches to race relations, the most
58
popular of which was the “conservative” approach. Southern conservatives
positioned themselves somewhere between the radical white “Negrophiles”
of the left and the equally radical white “Negrophobes” of the right.
They rejected the former as being “false friends” to newly freed blacks,
59
and the latter as being common, undesirable, and “lower-class.” They
opposed Jim Crow, but only because of their faith in white supremacy.
Southern conservatives simply believed, as Woodward observed, that
60
“Negro degradation was not a necessary corollary of white supremacy.”
Though the conservatives, for a time, mounted a strong campaign to
hold the left and right extremists at bay, they lacked the political will to
maintain their resistance. The left-leaning radicals and liberals likewise
retreated from their commitments to black equality. Thus, Jim Crow came
to dominate the South, regulating almost every facet of black life. We all
know, of course, that at least until the middle of the twentieth century,
this brutal form of white supremacy found legitimation through the courts.
But even as the courts sanctioned this “extreme” form of white supremacy
through decisions like Plessy, alternate discourses of racism found their
way into judicial opinions.
Echoes of pre-Jim Crow southern conservatism, for example, can be
heard in Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy, where he wrote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
61
caste here.

55. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23–25 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and holding that Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states,
not individuals).
56. 163 U.S. 537, 547–549 (1896).
57. Woodward, supra note 53.
58. The radical/Populist approach, as well as the liberal approach, to race relations also had many
supporters. Woodward, supra note 53, at 44–51.
59. Id. at 44–51.
60. Id. at 48.
61. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. Notably, in further support of his position on the wrongheadedness of the
Plessy majority, Justice Harlan also wrote in his dissent:
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Echoes of this particular conservative sentiment could likewise be found
in southern state court cases decided during the rise of Jim Crow.
B. Historical Background of the Cases
Caldwell v. Insurance Co. of Virginia was decided in 1905 by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina. There, Dinah Caldwell alleged that one
of the insurance agents of the Life Insurance Company of Virginia induced
62
her to take out life insurance policies for herself and her children. The
opinion’s language describing Ms. Caldwell and her circumstances is worth
reading, so I quote the court at length. It stated that Caldwell
is an illiterate colored woman, having ten (10) children. That sometime
during the year 1895, while she was engaged as a cook at the Buford
Hotel in Charlotte, the superintendent of the [insurance company] sent
for her to come to his office; that upon going to the office he asked her
if she had any objection to being “written up,” to which she replied
that she knew nothing about it—did not know what insurance meant.
He said that he would tell her, to which she replied that if he did, she
would know nothing about it then, to which he replied, “You will have
a nice hearse, nice carriage and a nice funeral.” She said, “I can’t feel
the ride in the hearse and I can’t see the funeral procession.” He said,
“You will have a heap of money,” to which she said, “I don’t want the
money if I’m dead. I have got to go to work at 3 o’clock in the morning
and am not going to take my money to pay insurance.” He said, “I will
tell you what you can do. You can come in for 10 years and after 10
years you can go out.” She said, “I don’t know anything about this. I
have been living with white people ever since I was born. I don’t know
anything about it and, I don’t want to fool with it.” He said: “Aunty,
you can go in for 10 years” . . . . [T]hat after 10 years I could draw out
63
the claim and if anything happened to me the claim would be paid.

Caldwell finally capitulated and for several years paid weekly premiums
on these life insurance policies.
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become
citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded
from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But by the statute in question, a Chinaman can
ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the
black race in Louisiana . . . who have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet
declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens
of the white race.
Id. at 561. For a fascinating study of how law, beginning with Asian exclusion (referenced in the above
excerpt), impacts Asian American racial formation, see Joshua Takano Chambers-Letson: A Race
So Different: Performance and Law in Asian America (2013). This Article makes no claims as to
Harlan’s specific political proclivities.
62. Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 52 S.E. 252, 253 (N.C. 1905).
63. Id. According to an entry describing a postcard at the turn of the century, archived at the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, the Buford Hotel stood at the corner of 4th and Tryon Streets
in Charlotte and operated from 1885 to 1915. Built in 1870 and intended originally for offices, the building
later housed The Commercial National Bank and the Union National Bank. Buford Hotel, J. Murrey
Adkins Libr. Special Collections, U.N.C. Charlotte, http://digitalcollections.uncc.edu/cdm/singleitem/
collection/p15483coll1/id/1398/rec/4 (last visited May 10, 2015).
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One of her co-workers, however, later read the policies and told
64
Caldwell that they were not as the agent had represented. Caldwell thus
went to see a Charlotte lawyer, one Col. Jones, who confirmed this state
65
of affairs. Caldwell went directly to Life’s agents to complain that the
policies were not as represented, and “after much going and coming, [Ms.
66
Caldwell] refused to pay any further premiums.” She then sued Life to
67
rescind the contract and recover her premium payments.
Caldwell’s case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for
her on an equitable contractual theory of fraudulent inducement. On
appeal, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict. In so doing, it felt compelled to
make a strong case for Ms. Caldwell’s good character:
She narrates her trials in her own simple and natural way, showing that
she was bewildered in the intricate mazes and confusing obscurities of
life insurance policies. In this respect, she is not singular. In the only
way open to her she was constantly protesting that something was wrong
about her insurance . . . . She proved an excellent character; her testimony
both in manner and in matter was well calculated to carry conviction to
the minds of jurors. The plaintiff is evidently one of the few remnants
of a type of her race illustrating its highest virtues. In the simple duties
of life incident to her station, she exhibits a store of saving common
sense . . . . She could not read the policies and it is no serious reflection
upon her intelligence to surmise that if she could have done so, she
would not have been very much the wiser. She did resist the
blandishment to which those of her race usually succumb—“a nice
funeral”—nor did she surrender to the persuasive assurance for which
many accredited with more wisdom, spend a live of slavery, “a heap of
money.” There is a vast deal of sound philosophy and sense in the
68
answers made by her to the agent.

The Caldwell case is remarkable on its face as an historical artifact. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the jury verdict awarding Ms.
69
Caldwell her money back, along with interest.
Bussell v. Bishop, a Georgia Supreme Court case published in 1921,
demonstrates how both equitable doctrines in contract and property law
can be wielded to remedy acts of racial terrorism. The plaintiff in Bussell,
Mr. Bishop, was a black sharecropper. He had entered into a typical
sharecropping agreement—an early form of an employer/employee
contract that replicated certain aspects of plantation life—with the
defendant Lee Bussell, whereby Bussell was to furnish land and fertilizer
and other agricultural necessities and Bishop to furnish tools, stock, and
70
labor necessary to cultivate and gather crops on their land. Soon after
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Caldwell, 52 S.E. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Id. See Part II.C for a discussion of how Caldwell performs the redemptive work of contract law.
Bussell v. Bishop, 110 S.E. 174, 174–75 (Ga. 1921).
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Bishop had planted the crops, Bussell organized a group of men, conspiring
to either kill Bishop or drive him from his home on the farm. On the night
of July 29, 1920, Bussell disguised himself behind “a white cloth or
handkerchief,” and, with four others, drove to within 400 yards of Bishop’s
71
home. One of Bussell’s confederates, J.B. Gaskins, was sent to lure Bishop
out of his home with a story of his wife and children being stuck in their
72
car in a ditch not far away. When Bishop followed Gaskins to his car,
Bussell and the others, who had been hiding in the bushes, jumped out
and assaulted him. A masked Bussell,
pointing a shotgun at the plaintiff, ordered [Bishop] to throw up his
hands, and proceeded to place a sheet over his head and to beat him
upon the head with some kind of instrument. Plaintiff was informed
that he was going to be killed, and, having but a moment to live, he begged
to be allowed to pray, and while down upon his knees the defendant
beat him over the head with all his might and power. Plaintiff was also
shot twice in the head by some one in the crowd, and a third shot missed
73
him as he broke away and ran.
74

Miraculously, Bishop survived. He refused to leave his home and land.
Bussell denied participating in the July 20 attack, but threatened that
if Bishop did not abandon and relinquish his rights in the land, he would
75
surely be killed in a subsequent attack. Bishop, fearing for his safety and
effectively unable to continue working the land, filed suit, requesting in
essence specific performance of the contract contingent on the appointment
of a specifically white receiver to take charge of the property at issue and
handle the crops and accounts between him and Bussell. The court
granted the remedy, despite the applicable legal rule, which stated that in
typical cases, a landlord such as Bussell could not be enjoined from taking
76
charge of crops in the absence of an allegation of insolvency.
In refusing to apply this standard rule, the court noted:
[T]he landlord did not elect to breach his contract with his cropper and
suffer the legal consequences thereof, but he sought to frighten the
cropper and to compel him through fright to abandon his contract. The
landlord resorted to violence, in short, to mob violence, to effectuate
77
his intent and purpose . . . .

The court also took care elsewhere in the opinion to indicate that Bishop
was a “negro” and Bussell a “white man,” and that in addition to being a
“negro,” Bishop was “old, one-armed, and suffering under the serious

71. Id. (syllabus).
72. Id. at 175.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Nicholson v. Cook, 76 Ga. 24 (1885)). Absent such insolvency, the sharecropper would
have an adequate remedy at law.
77. Id.
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disability of the wounds caused by the shots and licks inflicted upon him
78
by [Bussell] and his confederates.”
C. The Redemptive Work of CALDWELL and BUSSELL
From both a contracts and a racial/identity formation perspective,
the Caldwell and Bussell cases are extraordinary, particularly in light of
the historical circumstances discussed Part II.A. In terms of their broader
narrative, they are meaningful not only in terms of how they define and
develop the equitable doctrines of fraudulent inducement/misrepresentation
and equitable receivership as remedy for breach of contract, but also
because the black plaintiffs, in asserting their contractual remedies, were
asserting their rights to the protection of private contract law as equal
citizens under the law during the rise of Jim Crow, rather than through
still-developing civil rights law. These cases were not brought, after all, as
79
claims under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. These texts,
as historical accounts of law intersecting with racial reality, say something
important about the expansion of the “legal paradigm of voluntary market
80
relations” to encompass black citizens during the rise of Jim Crow. That
is, the plaintiffs used contract law to get material justice: Caldwell’s right
to get one’s money back and undo an exploitative deal or Bussell’s right
to be free from terrorizing harassment and earn one’s living.
The courts, in awarding the plaintiffs such “justice” through
contractual equity, recognized the inevitable tendency, in the world of
contracting—where market actors are often, because of embedded and
systemic socioeconomic subordination, on unequal footing—toward
exploitation, abuse, and injustice. Accordingly, the courts invoked the
law’s power vis-à-vis equitable doctrine to impose a systemically legitimate
contractual fix. Although the results in these cases are remarkable, given
when they were decided, the courts (and the law) certainly should not be
given more credit than is due. As discussed above, the southern
conservative sentiment, which was rooted in the ideology of white
supremacy, is expressed clearly in both cases. In Caldwell, for example,
the description of Ms. Caldwell as an uncommon “remnant . . . of a type
of her race illustrating its highest virtues” is clearly discursive in that it
represents Caldwell, in the court’s view, as an exceptional black person,
as one of the “good ones” whose trustworthiness, pathos, and acceptability
are embodied in her gender, old age, work ethic, good sense and wisdom,
in spite of—or perhaps because of—her formal illiteracy, and,
significantly, her deferential respect for racial hierarchy.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For an excellent overview of the history of section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, The Civil Rights Act of
1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayor Co., 77 Fordham L. Rev 999, 1032–36 (2008).
80. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 194.
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In this legal narrative, equity-based protection is extended to Ms.
Caldwell precisely because she did not “succumb” to things like “nice
funerals” and “heaps of money”—as those of her race apparently were
wont to do. Significant representational work is being done here, for the
opinion makes clear that the court would not have affirmed the jury’s
verdict to rescind the contract and award Ms. Caldwell the premiums she
had paid if she had been a more typical, or rather stereotypical, exemplar
of her race and gender. Caldwell’s embodiment of the “good” black,
elderly female enabled her to get her money back. The discursive effect?
Stereotypically “good blacks” may get justice under contract law, but “bad
blacks” (that is, those who would fit into the commonly held and racially
specific stereotypes of lazy and greedy) may not.
Similar work is being performed in Bussell, though more covertly. The
appointment of a receiver to oversee what was essentially an employer/
employee contract in that case, understood in historical context, was a
triumph. But closer examination of the narrative in the opinion about
Bishop reveals, again, some troubling representational aspects of the
case. It is interesting to note at the outset, as mentioned above, that
Bishop is never referred to by name in the text of the opinion; we know
only that he was “Colonel Bishop” per the additional syllabus later
provided by the editorial staff of the Southeast Reporter. In the opinion
itself, Bishop is described as hardworking, elderly, respectful, honest, and
one armed.
Thus scripted as the historically discursive “good” black male, who,
not incidentally, is also physically imperfect and weakened, the awarding
of this equitable legal remedy to Colonel Bishop, despite and perhaps
because of the criminal and then likely un-prosecutable conduct of the
white landowner and his “confederates,” seems eminently justified. But
what if Bishop had been young, with two strong arms, not physically
imperfect, and not as respectful of the white landowner? Would he have
brought suit? And if he had, would he have been given any justice? These
questions are unanswerable, of course, but given the language in the
opinion and the historical context, they are worth considering.
In light of the preceding discussion, one wonders whether Caldwell
and Bussell are good or bad cases. The answer, of course, depends on what
one means by “good” and “bad.” Are the cases exemplars of judicial
resistance in an era of legally sanctioned racial subordination vis-à-vis
Jim Crow, or do they merely reflect and reify a more genteel form of
white racism? What goals were being served by the law in these cases:
racial equality in an economic sense, or white supremacy in a cultural
sense? How is the law being used in the cases, not only by the courts (or
judges) themselves, but also by the black plaintiffs who brought these
actions?
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In the long trajectory of race relations in the United States, these
cases—like many cases that attempt to do some form of justice—
simultaneously perform both emancipatory and subordinating work, in
terms of socioeconomic equality and representational inequality,
respectively, and arguably represent two countervailing interpretations
of racial reality in the Jim Crow South. They demonstrate the way in
which law, as a state institution, can work in the same moment at crosspurposes in the emancipatory racial project, by providing a measure of
material justice while at the same time reinforcing a form of cultural
injustice. Moreover, that these cases were brought at all reflects an
optimistic faith in a legal system that was, at the same time, working hard
to ensure that the Ms. Caldwells and Colonel Bishops of the world, no
matter how racially exemplary, remained firmly in their place in the
racial social order: below whites.
That Caldwell and Bussell were brought as straight contract actions
and not as statutory civil rights cases, signals a recognition and
appreciation of economic rights as civil rights, and an understanding of
the interconnectedness of racial and economic subordination. Ms.
Caldwell and Colonel Bishop asserted those rights, supposedly secured
by the Reconstruction Amendments and enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, in the face of tremendous legal, institutional, and social
resistance to black equality. The North Carolina and Georgia courts,
perhaps also acting to a degree out of type of defiance to that resistance,
used contract law to undo an economically exploitative form of white
supremacy. In doing so, however, those courts reified an insidious
cultural form of white supremacy. The Caldwell and Bussell opinions
may be read, in this respect, as expressions of southern whites of a
“better class,” whose belief in equal contract rights must be considered
against a more abiding belief in white supremacy, consistent with the
81
post-Reconstruction “conservative” approach to the “Negro problem.”

Conclusion
Through critical readings of the Caldwell and Bussell cases, we can
see how legal actors—the parties, their lawyers, the judges, and the jurors—
work to redeem and rehabilitate the rules of contract so as to enable
desirous outsiders to get into the game. As this Article hopes to have
demonstrated, however, the cost of entry can be high. The successful,
and in these cases certainly brave, assertions of economic power by Ms.
Caldwell and Col. Bishop, particularly in times of such tremendous
economic, social, and political change, might very well have depended on
unintentional capitulation to persisting race and gender ideologies. But is
contract law bound to “preserve” as it “transforms”—as it did in the
81. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text.
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Caldwell and Bussell cases—or can it transcend this entrenched paradigm?
It is my hope that this Article, as a first step in the development of a
“redemptive” narrative and theory of contract law, begins to answer that
question in a way that appropriately pays tribute to the Dinah Caldwells
and Colonel Bishops of the contracting world.
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